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The ‘belief bias’ effect is one of the most pervasie findings in the study of syllogistic 
reasoning. Here, participants respond “valid” to more believable than unbelievable conclusions, 
regardless of the actual validity of the conclusion. There is also an interaction characteristic of 
the belief bias effect, in that conclusion believability plays a greater role when conclusions are 
invalid than when they are valid. The experiments repo ted in this thesis had two goals: first, to 
determine how individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity influence belief bias in 
reasoning; and second, to indentify which WM system are involved in syllogistic deductive 
reasoning. To this end, both experiments employed a dual task paradigm.  
In Experiment 1, participants remembered spatial arr ys whilst reasoning through 
syllogisms in order to load the visuospatial sketchpad. Results demonstrated that performance on 
the secondary spatial memory task suffered when participants reasoned through syllogisms of 
which the validity and believability of conclusions were incongruent (i.e., “conflict” problems), 
indicating that reasoning through conflict problems utilized limited visuospatial WM resources. 
Also, only participants with high WM capacities showed the typical belief-bias effect, with 
greater effects of conclusion believability on invalid than on valid conclusions. This interaction 
was not present for low WM span participants, because they made greater errors on problems 
with invalid, unbelievable conclusions. 
In Experiment 2, participants remembered digit sequences whilst reasoning in order to 
load the phonological loop. Both of the major results from Experiment 1 were replicated. 
Accuracy on the secondary digit recall task was impaired when participants reasoned through 
conflict problems, demonstrating that limited verbal WM resources were directed toward 
reasoning. Again, only high WM span participant showed the interaction between conclusion 
validity and believability characteristic of the belief bias effect. Effects were additive for low 
WM span participants because they made more errors on invalid, unbelievable syllogisms. 
Results from both experiments demonstrate first, that both visuospatial and verbal WM 
resources are involved in syllogistic reasoning, and second, that individuals with different 
amounts of available WM resources demonstrate differential belief bias. These results are 
discussed in terms of the mental models and mental logic theories of reasoning and in terms of 
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It is a well-accepted finding that humans are far from rational when reasoning and 
problem-solving (e.g., Cohen, 1981). Rather than resoning in a purely logical or normative 
fashion, people’s decision-making is often influencd by past experiences and knowledge. A 
prime example of this is the belief-bias effect, first systematically examined by Evans, Barston, 
and Pollard (1983) and replicated in numerous studies (see Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000 for 
a review). Evans et al. discovered that when people reason through syllogisms in studies of 
deductive reasoning, in which they must determine wh ther a conclusion logically follows from 
a set of premises, they are often influenced by the beli vability of the conclusions. Specifically, 
people are more likely to endorse the conclusion as valid when it is believable than when it is 
unbelievable. For example, people often respond that the conclusion, “Therefore, some cigarettes 
are not addictive” is invalid because it is unbelievable, regardless of whether it logically follows 
from a set of premises. Further, there is an interac ion between the effects of conclusion validity 
and believability characteristic of the belief bias effect, in that conclusion believability plays a 
greater role for invalid than for valid conclusions.   
Biases in reasoning may vary among people with differing cognitive abilities. For 
example, those with greater cognitive abilities may be more likely to reason in accordance with 
logic and less prone to bias when reasoning. This the is provides a direct examination of the role 
of one such cognitive ability, working memory (WM) capacity, in belief bias and examines how 
individual differences in WM capacity influence peole’s susceptibility to bias in syllogistic 
reasoning. For the purposes of this thesis, WM is conceptualized in terms of Baddeley and 
Hitch’s (1974) model of working memory, which proposes that working memory is composed of  
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three separate, yet interdependent components, the phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad, 
and central executive.  
The Role of WM in Deductive Reasoning 
Theories of deductive reasoning are hotly debated, with each specifying a significant role 
of WM. The mental models account of deductive reasoning, pioneered by Johnson-Laird (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984), proposes that when confronted with a syllogism, people construct 
models of information contained in the premises. Mental models can be thought of as iconic, 
diagram-like spatial representations of information c tained in premises (Johnson-Laird, 2001; 
Knauff, Mulack, Kassubek, Salih, & Greenlee, 2002). For simple, “one model” syllogisms (e.g., 
“All poodles are dogs; All dogs are mammals; Therefor , all poodles are mammals”), only one 
model is required to sufficiently represent the premises; whereas for other, “multiple model” 
syllogisms (e.g., “Some poodles are dogs; No mammals are dogs; Therefore, some mammals are 
not poodles”), reasoners must create several models and counter models (which represent 
information contrary to premises) to represent the information contained in the premises. 
Reasoners then test the problem’s conclusion against their mental models. If conclusions are 
consistent with the model and if no counter models can be found, then it is accepted as valid, and 
if it is inconsistent with the model or is consistent with a counter model, it is rejected as invalid 
(Chater & Oaksford, 2001).  
A key feature of the mental models account is the search for counter models – without a 
thorough search for falsifying models, reasoning errors are likely (Newstead, Thompson, & 
Handley, 2002). For example, an invalid conclusion may be accepted as valid when the search 
for falsifying models is prematurely halted, and evid nce from numerous studies suggests that 
reasoners often accept or reject a conclusion based on a perfunctory search of alternative models 
3 
 
(e.g., Evans, Handley, Harper, & Johnson-Laird, 1999). Further, several studies have found that 
reasoning accuracy is much higher for syllogisms with only one possible model than for 
syllogisms with several models that must be considered, presumably because people fail to 
consider all possible models (Chater & Oaksford, 2001). Naturally, considering several possible 
models simultaneously requires sufficient WM capacity (Evans et al., 1999). Thus, according to 
the mental models account, individual differences in people’s reasoning abilities may result 
because limitations in WM capacities mean that some people are unable to conceptualize all 
possible models. For the mental models account, given that mental models are spatial 
representations of relationships contained in premis s, spatial WM (i.e., the visuospatial 
sketchpad) is imperative in deductive reasoning.  
A competing class of theories, knows as mental logic accounts (e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 
1998, Rips, 1994), explain deductive reasoning, particularly conditional reasoning, by proposing 
that people reason through deductive reasoning problems by utilizing rules of formal logic. Such 
rules allow reasoners to make inferences about relations among entities within premises. 
Problem difficulty is dictated by the number of rules or processing steps required to verify or 
falsify the conclusion. Similar to the mental models account, reasoning errors arise when people 
fail to use correct formal logic rules due to limitat ons in processing, or WM, capacity 
(Schroyens, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2001). However, contrary to the mental models account, 
which propose that premises are represented as spatial models, mental logic accounts assume that 
premises and formal logic rules are represented in a purely verbal, language-like fashion. Hence, 
mental logic accounts assign an important role to verbal WM (i.e., the phonological loop).  
Studies confirming the role of WM in syllogistic deductive reasoning are abundant, 
although the results of these studies are somewhat inconsistent. Several researchers found 
4 
 
correlations between WM capacity and reasoning accur y. Copeland and Radvansky (2004), for 
example, found a positive correlation between general WM span and accuracy on a syllogistic 
reasoning task. Similarly, Kyllonen and Christal (1990) found strong positive correlations 
between several measures of WM capacity and several reasoning measures, including syllogistic 
reasoning. Further, Capon, Handley, and Dennis (2003) report positive correlations between 
performance on both spatial WM and verbal WM measures and a syllogistic reasoning measure.  
Other studies have employed dual task paradigms, in wh ch participants must complete a 
secondary task designed to deplete WM resources while simultaneously reasoning through 
syllogisms. For example, Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick, and Wynn (1993) loaded the phonological 
loop through sequential number verbalization, the visuospatial sketchpad through clockwise 
finger-tapping, and the central executive through random number generation. They found that 
loading the phonological loop and central executive impaired accuracy on syllogistic reasoning, 
although loading the visuospatial sketchpad had no effect on reasoning accuracy. In a later study 
(Gilhooly, Logie, & Wynn, 2002), the researchers found that concurrent reasoning impaired 
finger-tapping only when premises were presented sequentially, which presumably places a 
greater load on WM than when premises are presented concurrently. Thus, the researchers 
concluded that the phonological loop and central executive play major roles in syllogistic 
reasoning, whereas the visuospatial sketchpad playsa more minor role. However, another 
possibility is that finger tapping did not load its targeted WM component to the same extent that 
number verbalization or random number generation did, and thus its effects were not seen on 
reasoning performance when premises were presented simultaneously. Also, importantly, these 




The Role of WM in Belief Bias 
 Fewer studies have been conducted to illuminate the involvement of WM in biased 
responding in deductive reasoning, such as in the beli f bias effect, although the popular dual 
process theory of information processing can lend some useful predictions. Dual process 
accounts of reasoning (Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000; Sloman, 1996) assert that 
there are two systems of reasoning, referred to here as the heuristic and analytic system. The 
heuristic system is conceptualized to be automatic and efficient, can operate without awareness, 
draws on prior beliefs and experiences, and is not limited by strained cognitive resources. 
Conversely, the analytic system is thought to be cons i us and effortful, to be free from bias, and 
to demand sufficient WM resources (Osman, 2004). For many decisions, the heuristic system, 
drawing on previous experiences and beliefs, provides a quick response. However, for situations 
requiring careful analysis, such as in syllogistic reasoning, the analytic system must draw on 
available WM resources to carefully reason through the problem. In these situations, the 
automatic heuristic system must be suppressed, which also requires WM resources. When 
sufficient WM resources are unavailable, the analytic system fails to suppress the heuristic 
system, and a response based on unconscious, biasedproc ssing results. In the case of syllogistic 
reasoning, it is assumed that the heuristic system initially provides a response based on the 
believability of the conclusion - if it is believable, it is accepted as valid, whereas it if it is 
unbelievable, it is rejected as invalid. Subsequently, the analytic system logically reasons 
through the problem and overrides the heuristic system if necessary. However, when WM 
resources are strained, possibly due to a limited WM span, divided attention, or to problem 
difficulty, strategic analytical processing fails. The reasoner then decides upon the response 
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suggested by the heuristic system and provides a reponse based on the believability of the 
conclusion. 
The use of the heuristic versus the analytic system is evident on problems in which the 
validity and believability of the conclusions conflict – that is, for valid, unbelievable conclusions 
and for invalid, believable conclusions. For these “conflict” problems, analytic and heuristic 
processes elicit different responses (Evans, 2007). For instance, consider the following 
syllogism: No healthy people are athletic; Some astronauts are athletic; Therefore, some healthy 
people are not athletic. The conclusion is invalid (i.e., does not logically follow from the 
premises), yet believable. In this case, because the conclusion is consistent with what the 
reasoner knows about the world, the heuristic system automatically indicates that the conclusion 
is valid. Subsequently, if the analytic system successfully reasons through the problem, it will 
correctly identify the conclusion to be invalid.  
 Clearly, dual processing accounts of reasoning assi n a primary role to WM capacity in 
successful reasoning. Given that sufficient WM resources are necessary to suppress the biased 
responses provided by the heuristic system, these theories predict that individuals with a higher 
WM span should be less susceptible to belief bias. Previous research supports this prediction: 
Quayle and Ball (2000), for example, found that participants with high spatial WM spans showed 
a decreased belief bias effect (i.e., were more accur te) relative to participants with low spatial 
WM spans. Similarly, De Neys (2006) found that participants with high WM span were more 
accurate when responding to problems in which the validity and believability of the conclusions 
conflicted than were participants with low WM spans. Thus, research supports a pivotal role of 




 Further, there is evidence to suggest that those with high and low WM capacities use 
different strategies when reasoning through syllogisms, with individuals with more WM 
resources using more complex strategies. For example, Copeland and Radvansky (2004) report 
that individuals with large WM spans responded to syllogisms in ways that were consistent with 
complex reasoning strategies, such as considering several mental models as predicted by the 
mental models account, whereas responses made by individuals with small WM spans were 
consistent with simple, heuristic based strategies. If people with larger WM spans use more 
complex strategies, a concurrent WM task should yield greater performance decrements for them 
than for people with smaller WM spans, whose heuristic-based strategies do not draw heavily on 
WM resources. Although this phenomenon has not beenreported in deductive reasoning, it has 
been found in other domains: High WM participants were more impaired by a concurrent load 
task during a memory retrieval task than were low WM participants (Rosen & Engle, 1997). 
Further, mathematical problem-solving accuracy decreases more for high WM capacity 
individuals than for low WM capacity individuals under conditions of high pressure, which are 
presumed to consume WM resources (Beilock & Carr, 2005; Beilock & DeCaro, 2007). Thus, 
taxing cognitive resources should have larger effects on reasoners with high WM spans, 
presuming that they are more inclined to use complex reasoning strategies that are adaptive 
under normal conditions. When their strategies, which are heavily dependent on limited WM 
resources, are disrupted, they may be more susceptible to heuristic-based responses than are 
individuals with low WM spans, thus demonstrating a heightened belief bias effect under 
conditions of WM load. 
The Current Research 
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 Unlike past studies examining the role of WM in syllogistic reasoning, which used 
correlational or between subjects approaches, the curr nt studies used a dual task approach to 
manipulate the amount of WM resources available during syllogistic reasoning to directly 
investigate the role of WM in belief bias. This approach will not only address inconsistencies in 
the results of studies examining the role of WM in deductive reasoning, it will also illuminate 
which components of WM are crucial for unbiased analytic reasoning. The current studies will 
also compare the belief bias effect in high WM and low WM participants as a function of a high 
and low WM load, to determine whether high and low WM span participants are differentially 
impaired by a load task due to different strategy use.   
Additionally, because participants may choose to assign limited cognitive resources to the 
primary reasoning task, this thesis takes a somewhat novel approach by emphasizing 
impairments on the secondary load task along with the primary reasoning task. Reduced WM 
resources may cause decrements on the reasoning task: Specifically, limited WM resources may 
result in failure of the analytic system, causing the heuristic system to provide a response 
consistent with the believability of the conclusion. Conversely, effects of depleted WM resources 
may manifest on the load task: Accuracy may decrease when WM resources are required to 
suppress the heuristic system when the heuristic and analytic system provide competing 
responses (that is, when the validity and believability of the conclusion conflict). Either finding 
would indicate that the primary reasoning task and the secondary load task compete for the same 







 The purpose of Experiment 1 was to determine whether concurrent syllogistic reasoning 
and a visuospatial memory task would cause interfernce in either task, thus supporting the 
assertion of mental models accounts that visuospatial WM is pivotal in deductive reasoning. 
Also, Experiment 1 directly compares belief-bias effects (both main effects of conclusion 
believability and validity, and the believability x validity interaction) across individuals of 
different WM capacities to directly examine whether reasoning processes vary according to 
individuals’ WM spans. It was predicted that high WM span participants would be more 
impaired when under high WM load than would low WM span participants, thereby relying 
more heavily on reasoning according to beliefs than when not under load. This is in line with the 
somewhat counterintuitive finding indicating that individuals with low WM spans are less 
impaired than those with high WM spans when WM resources are taxed, possibly because they 
already use simple, heuristic-based strategies that do not draw heavily on WM resources (Rosen 
& Engle, 1997). 
Method 
Participants  
 Sixty undergraduate students in psychology courses at the University of Waterloo 
participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit.  
Materials 
 Reasoning task. Participants were required to evaluate the logical validity of 16 
categorical syllogisms, eight of which were valid and eight of which were invalid. All syllogisms 




No A are B; Some C are B; Therefore, some C are not A  (Valid) 
No A are B; Some C are B; Therefore, some A are not C  (Invalid) 
 
The syllogisms used in this thesis were adapted from Evans et al. (1983) and from Klauer et al., 
2000 and appear in Appendix A. The syllogisms were constructed such that the conclusions of 
half were believable and the conclusions of the othr half were unbelievable. In the stimuli set, 
there were four syllogisms in each of the validity/believability cells [i.e., valid/believable (VB), 
valid/unbelievable (VU), invalid/believable (IB), and invalid/unbelievable(IU)]. To 
counterbalance stimuli, after 30 participants were t sted the validity of each syllogism was 
changed, while retaining the content and conclusion believability, by altering the order of items 
within the premises. For example, the valid syllogism, “No cigarettes are inexpensive; Some 
addictive things are inexpensive, Therefore, some addictive things are not cigarettes,” becomes 
invalid when the premises are altered: “No addictive hings are inexpensive; Some cigarettes are 
inexpensive; Therefore, some addictive things are not cigarettes.” 
Memory Task. A visuospatial memory task served as the secondary task in this 
experiment. Patterns of shapes appeared on the screen p ior to each syllogism. Participants were 
instructed to remember the pattern for a recall test following each syllogism. In Low load trials, a 
single five-sided shape with an incomplete right or left side appeared on the screen briefly. In the 
recall task following each syllogism, a shape appeared on the screen that was either identical to 
or different from the shape prior to the syllogism (i.e., the incomplete side was on the same side 
or was on the opposite side). Half of the arrays matched the initial arrays, and half were different. 
Participants indicated, by key press, whether the shape was the same as or different from the 
shape they were asked to remember. High load trialsproceeded as low load trials, except that 
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displays consisted of four incomplete shapes instead of one in order to place a greater load on 
cognitive resources. In the recall test, the display w s either identical to the studied array or 
differed in one or more shape.   
WM Measure. In order to obtain an estimate of working memory, participants completed 
a version of the Computation Span task, adapted from Salthouse and Babcock (1991). 
Participants saw a series of simple addition or subtraction problems on the computer screen (e.g., 
4 + 2 = ?). They were instructed to say the answer to ach problem aloud while remembering the 
final digit in the equation (e.g., “2” in the previous example). When participants had recited the 
answers to all equations in the trial, the equations were removed from the screen and participants 
were prompted to write down the final digit from each equation, in order, on a sheet of paper.  
 The task began with only one equation in each trial. After three such trials, an additional 
equation was added to each trial. The task continued in this fashion until participants failed to 
correctly recall, in order, the numbers in at least two of the three trials at a given difficulty level. 
The WM span of each participant was thus defined as the number of digits in a set for which the 
participant successfully recalled digits in two of the three trials.  
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and completed the deductive reasoning task first. 
For this task, participants read the following instruc ions: “This is an experiment to test people’s 
reasoning ability. You will be given 16 problems. On each screen, you will be shown two 
statements and you are asked if certain conclusions (given below the statements) may be 
logically deduced from them. You should answer thisquestion on the assumption that the two 
statements are, in fact, true. If you judge that the conclusion necessarily follows from the 
statements, you should answer “yes”, otherwise “no”. Answer “yes” by pressing the ‘/’ key, and 
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answer “no” by pressing the ‘Z’ key. Please take your time and be sure that you have the right 
answer before moving on.” 
Participants completed two practice trials with the experimenter before beginning the 
task, and were given the opportunity to ask any questions before the experiment began. Of 16 
syllogisms, eight were randomly assigned to High Load r Low Load conditions for each 
participant, and within each block, problems appeared in a random order. High load and low load 
trials were blocked within participants, with their order being randomly determined. The 
sequence of each trial is depicted in Figure 1. At the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross 
appeared on the screen for 1000 ms, followed by a display of one shape (in low load trials) or 
four shapes (in high load trials) for 3000 ms. Participants then evaluated a syllogism by 
indicating whether the conclusion was valid or invalid by pressing the appropriate key. An array 
of shapes followed, and participants indicated whether he array was the same as (‘/’) or different 
from (‘Z’) the array preceding the syllogism. Following the computerized reasoning task, 
participants completed the Computation Span task with the experimenter.  
Results and Discussion  
Sixty participants were tested. Data from one were r moved due to failure to understand 
instructions. Prior to analyses, subjects were divided into two groups based on WM span. WM 
Span, according to the Computation Span task, ranged from 2 to 7, with a mean of 4.90 and a 
median of 5. Participants were divided into high and low span groups according to their position 
relative to the median. Because 17 participants scored the median span, and a median split would 
yield unbalanced groups, only the data from participants falling on either side of the median were 
analyzed. Participants scoring 4 or lower on the Computation Span task were categorized as “low 
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span” (n = 20), and those scoring 6 or higher were categorized as “high span” (n = 22). Mean 
endorsement proportions, categorized by load and by WM span, are displayed in Table 1. 
In order to determine effects of load and WM span on belief bias, a 2 (Load condition: 
High, Low) x 2 (Conclusion validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion believability: Believable, 
Unbelievable) x 2 (WM Span: Low, High) repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on 
endorsement proportions, using WM Span as a between-subjects variable. Results from this 
ANOVA will be discussed first, in terms of the general belief bias effect, second, in terms of 
load effects, and third, in terms of span differences. Finally, accuracy on the load task will be 
discussed. 
Belief Bias 
 The typical belief bias effect was observed in that participants were more likely to 
endorse valid than invalid conclusions, F(1, 40) = 34.2, MSE = .663, p < .001, and believable 
than unbelievable conclusions, F(1, 40) = 11.8, MSE = .746, p = .001. An interaction between 
the effects of validity and belief was also found, such that the effect of believability was more 
pronounced on invalid conclusions than valid conclusions, F(1, 40) = 5.01, MSE = .349, p = 
.031. 
WM Span Differences 
Mean endorsement rates of high span and low span partici nts, collapsed across load, 
are shown in Figure 2. The four-way ANOVA using endorsement proportions as the dependent 
variable revealed an interaction between WM span and co clusion validity, F (1, 40) = 4.072, 
MSE = .663, p = .050 (WM span did not interact with any other factors, nor was there a main 
effect of WM span, all F’s < 1). To explore this interaction and to directly explore belief bias in 
the two WM groups, two-way ANOVAS were performed on each WM group individually. 
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High span participants endorsed more valid than inval d conclusions, F(1, 21) = 27.28, 
MSE = 1.437, p > .001 and more believable than unbelievable conclusions, F(1, 21) = 8.47, MSE 
= 1.329, p = .009. The typical interaction between the effects of validity and believability was 
marginally significant, F(1, 21) = 3.13, MSE = .739, p = .085. Similarly, for low span 
participants there were significant main effects of validity, F(1, 19) = 8.33, MSE = 1.23, p = 
.009, and marginally significant effects of believability, F(1, 19) = 3.99, MSE = 1.64, p = .059. 
Interestingly, however, these effects were clearly dditive; The typical interaction between 
validity and believability was not found, F(1, 19) = 1.71, MSE = .66, p = .20. Thus, only 
participants with high WM spans demonstrated the int raction characteristic of the robust belief 
bias effect.  
For participants with low WM spans, the typical belief bias interaction was not found 
because they quite frequently responded “Valid” to invalid, unbelievable conclusions. 
Participants with high WM spans, however, were more likely to solve these problems correctly.  
Load Effects 
A crucial question addressed in this thesis is whether participants demonstrated a higher 
belief bias effect under depleted WM conditions. That is, if the visual load task successfully 
depleted WM resources required for deductive reasoning, participants would be expected to 
reason in accordance with beliefs more in the High Load condition than in the Low Load 
condition. Similarly, participants should use logic more successfully in the Low Load condition 
than in the High Load condition. Finally, the entire belief bias effect may be exacerbated under 
depleted WM conditions. That is, the interaction between belief and logic may be more 
pronounced on High Load trials than on Low Load trials.  
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The four-way repeated measures ANOVA indicated that WM load did not interact with 
validity or believability, nor with the typical Validity x Belief interaction, for either high or low 
WM span participants (for all, F < 1). Thus, loading WM had no impact on endorsement rates on 
the reasoning task and did not exacerbate the belief ias effect. Two interpretations are possible: 
Either visuospatial WM is not required for deductive reasoning, or any deficits in performance 
due to the load task manifested on the load task itself, rather than on the deductive reasoning 
task. For example, when the believability and validity of the syllogism elicit conflicting 
responses (e.g., a valid, unbelievable syllogism or an invalid, believable syllogism), WM 
resources may be directed toward deducing the correct answer to the syllogism rather than 
rehearsing the visuospatial pattern from the load task.  This possibility was examined in the 
following analysis. 
Mean accuracy proportions for high and low WM span rticipants are found in Table 2. 
Load accuracy was collapsed across load difficulty (i.e., High vs. Low Load), because load 
difficulty did not affect responding in the previous analysis discussed. To examine whether 
participants sacrificed accuracy on the load task to reason through syllogisms with conflicting 
validity and believability, a 2 (Validity) x 2 (Beli vability) x 2 (WM span) ANOVA was run 
using accuracy on the load task as the dependent variable and WM span as a between subjects 
variable.  
There were no main effects of conclusion validity (F = 1.17), or believability (F = 2.27) 
on load accuracy. Interestingly, the analysis revealed  significant interaction between the effects 
of validity and believability, F(1,40) = 4.84, MSE = .136, p = .034.  To explore this interaction, 
load accuracy corresponding to conflict and no-conflict problems was directly compared. Data 
confirm that participants sacrificed accuracy on the load task in order to reason about conflict 
16 
 
problems: Memory for the arrays was less accurate for trials involving conflict problems (i.e., 
when beliefs and logic provided incongruent responses) than for those involving no-conflict 
problems, t(41) = 2.24, S.E. = .159, p = .03, indicating that reasoning and visuospatial rehearsal 
compete for the same cognitive resources – thus, visuospatial WM is in fact involved in 
deductive reasoning. Moreover, participants with high WM spans were more accurate on the 
load task than were participants with low WM spans, F(1, 40) = 4.373, p = .043. An interaction 
between WM Span and Believability was also found, F(1, 40) = 4.09, MSE = .196, p = .050, 
whereby individuals with low WM spans showed larger costs on the secondary task when 
reasoning about unbelievable, as opposed to believab , syllogisms. Other than the significant 
findings reported above, there were no interactions among WM span, validity, and believability 
(all F’s < 1).    
 To summarize the results of Experiment 1, only participants with high WM spans 
demonstrated the typical belief bias effect, whereas participants with low WM spans did not 
demonstrate the interaction typically found between validity and believability. Further, although 
there were no effects of the visuospatial WM load task on the reasoning task, effects of the 
reasoning task were found on the load task. Specifically, accuracy was lowest on the load task 
when participants reasoned through syllogisms in which the validity and believability of 
conclusions conflicted. This finding suggests that limited WM resources were particularly taxed 
when participants reasoned through conflict problems, and is in line with dual process theories. 
When the validity and believability of conclusions are not congruent, the analytic and heuristic 
systems provide opposite responses. Thus, participants may have utilized WM resources to 
suppress the biased response of the heuristic system, resulting in fewer resources available to 




 Experiment 2 was conducted, first, to replicate the novel finding from Experiment 1 that 
only participants with high WM spans show the typical belief bias effect. Second, results from 
Experiment 1 indicate that the visuospatial load task drew from the same WM resources as did 
the syllogistic reasoning task. Experiment 2 also sought to determine whether syllogistic 
reasoning relies on verbal WM resources, as predict by the mental logic account of reasoning, 
by loading the phonological loop with a digit span t sk, assumed to elicit verbal rehearsal. Due to 
the finding that the effects of the concurrent reasoning and memory task manifested on the load 
task in Experiment 1, it was expected that syllogisms conflicting in validity and believability 
would draw WM resources away from digit rehearsal, thereby reducing accuracy on the load task 
in this experiment. In addition, a verbal load task may be a more domain specific WM load 
manipulation, given that the syllogisms are presented verbally on the computer screen. As such, 
the phonological load task used here may disrupt reasoning on the primary task as well as 
impairing performance on the secondary load task.  
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-two undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at the University of 
Waterloo participated in exchange for course credit or for $5.  
Method and Materials 
In order to deplete the verbal resources likely utilized in deductive reasoning, Experiment 
2 employed a verbal recall secondary task as opposed t  the visuospatial recognition task used in 
Experiment 1. The sequence of events in one trial is shown in Figure 3. In Low Load trials, 
participants remembered two digits that appeared on the screen for 3000 ms, and following the 
18 
 
syllogism recalled the numbers by keying them in, in the order given, using the keyboard and 
then pressing ‘ENTER.’ In High Load trials, participants remembered five digits, also shown on 
the screen for 3000 ms. The rest of the materials and procedure were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1.  
Results and Discussion 
Of the 82 subjects run, data from 2 were excluded from analyses due to failure to 
understand instructions. Again, participants were divided into two groups based on WM span. 
WM span ranged from 1 to 7, with a mean of 4.78 and a median of 5. A median split categorized 
participants into High Span (span of 5 or greater, n = 47) and Low Span (span of 4 or lower, n =
33) groups. Mean endorsement proportions, categorized by load and by WM span, are displayed 
in Table 3. 
Again, endorsement proportions were submitted to a 2 (Load condition: High, Low) x 2 
(Conclusion validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 
(WM Span: Low, High) repeated measures ANOVA, using WM Span as a between-subjects 
variable. Referring to this ANOVA, belief bias will be examined first, followed by span 
differences. Finally, load effects will be examined.  
Belief Bias 
 As expected, the typical belief bias effect was found: Participants were more likely to 
endorse valid than invalid conclusions, F(1, 78) = 37.63, MSE = .147, p < .001, and believable 
than unbelievable conclusions, F(1, 78) = 23.04, MSE = .164, p < .001. An interaction between 
validity and belief was marginally significant: Effects of believability were more pronounced on 
invalid conclusions than valid conclusions, F(1, 78) = 3.650, MSE = .096, p = .060. 
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WM Span Differences 
 Endorsement proportions for High Span and Low Span participants are shown in Figure 
4. In the four-way ANOVA described above, WM Span did not interact with Conclusion 
Validity (F = 2.14) nor with Conclusion Believability (F < 1). However, a significant three-way 
interaction between WM Span, Conclusion Validity, and Conclusion Believability was found, 
F(1, 78) = 11.78, MSE = .096 p = .001.    
To explore this interaction, 2 (Validity) x 2 (Belivability) ANOVAs were run on High 
Span and Low Span groups independently. Results corroborate the findings of Experiment 1. 
The typical belief bias effect was found in high span participants, with main effects of both 
validity, F(1, 46) = 31.160, MSE = 1.322, p < .001, and believability, F(1, 46) = 10.738, MSE = 
1.340, p = .002, and a validity x believability interaction, F(1, 46) = 22.081, MSE = .602, p < 
.001. For low span participants, however, only main effects of validity, (1, 32) = 11.27, MSE = 
.971, p = .002, and believability, F(1, 32) = 16.03, MSE = 1.208, p = .001, were found. These 
effects were additive rather than interactive (F < 1). Thus, as in Experiment 1, only participants 
with high WM spans showed the interaction between validity and believability characteristic of 
the typical belief bias finding. Again, the interesting difference between participants with high 
and low WM spans is found when conclusions are invalid and unbelievable. Low span 
participants make more errors for these problems by endorsing the conclusions as valid, whereas 
high span participant are relatively accurate on these problems.  
Load Effects 
Like Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 I examined whether depleting WM resources by 
introducing a cognitive load would magnify belief bias. Again, there was no three-way 
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interaction between load condition, conclusion validity, and conclusion believability, F < 1, 
indicating that load did not influence belief bias on the reasoning task.  
Load accuracy was analyzed to determine whether partici nts were more accurate on the 
secondary load task when the validity and believability of conclusions conflicted, as was found 
in Experiment 1. Proportions of correct trials on the load task are shown in Table 4. Again, 
because load did not influence responding on the reasoning task, load accuracy was collapsed 
across load condition when analyzing load accuracy. Load accuracy was submitted to a 2 
(Validity) x 2 (Believability) x 2 (WM Span) repeated measures ANOVA, using WM Span as a 
between-subjects factor.  An interaction between validity and believability was found, F(1, 78) = 
4.330, MSE = .225, p = .041.  As in Experiment 1, participants were less accurate on the load 
task when the validity and believability of the syllogism elicited conflicting responses than when 
validity and believability were congruent, t(79) = 1.996, SE = .150, p = .049. Thus, participants 
again dedicated limited WM toward the reasoning task at the expense of the load task. This 
finding indicates that a digit span task, presumed to elicit phonological rehearsal, and syllogistic 
reasoning draw from the same pool of verbal WM resources, and supports the position of mental 
logic theorists that reasoning involves verbal representation of the problem.   
This ANOVA also revealed an interaction between WM Span and Believability, F(1, 78) 
= 11.426, MSE = .042, p = .001), unlike Experiment 1, however, the locus of this interaction was 
such that individuals with high WM spans showed larger costs on the secondary task when 
reasoning with unbelievable, as opposed to believabl  syllogisms. No other main effects or 
interactions were found (all F’s < 1.33).  
 Experiment 2 replicated and extended the results of Experiment 1. First, the novel finding 
that only individuals with high WM capacities demonstrate the characteristic interaction between 
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conclusion validity and believability was replicated. In particular, participants with low WM 
spans erroneously responded “Valid” to invalid, unbelievable conclusions more often than did 
participants with high WM spans. Second, syllogistic reasoning interfered with a secondary 
cognitive load task such that when participants were r quired to suppress a heuristic response 
that conflicted with an analytic or logical response, accuracy on the load task suffered. Taken 
together, the results from Experiments 1 and 2 may indicate that because syllogistic reasoning 
interfered with both a visuospatial and verbal memory l ad task, reasoning requires both visual 
and verbal WM resources. Conversely, it could be that both load tasks taxed resources in the 
central executive, and it is these overlapping resources that are crucial for reasoning through 

















 The current studies investigated the role of WM in syllogistic reasoning using two 
strategies: A dual task paradigm independently loaded components of WM, and belief bias was 
compared across participants of different WM spans. The results and implications derived from 
each of these strategies will be discussed individually. 
The Role of Visuospatial and Verbal WM in Reasoning 
 First, involvement of WM in syllogistic reasoning was directly investigated by reducing 
limited WM resources with a load task and examining the resulting deficits on both the reasoning 
task and on the load task. Although loading WM did not directly influence responding on the 
reasoning task, when reasoners were faced with confli t problems (i.e., for which logic and 
beliefs were incongruous), accuracy on the load task suffered. This finding, which was found in 
both Experiments 1 and 2, can be interpreted in terms of dual process theories of reasoning. For 
conflict problems, the analytic system and heuristic ystem provide different answers. For 
example, consider a problem with a valid but unbelievable conclusion. The heuristic system, 
which is thought to proceed relatively automatically nd thus demands few cognitive resources, 
provides a response based on past knowledge or bias – In this case, “Invalid,” because the 
conclusion contradicts the reasoner’s knowledge about the world. Because this answer is 
incorrect, as is the case for heuristic responses to all conflict problems, the heuristic system must 
be suppressed, which requires cognitive resources. The slow and effortful analytic system then 
reasons logically through the problem. Because WM resources are recruited to suppress the 
heuristic system, fewer resources are available to dedicate to rehearsing the WM load. As a 
result, accuracy on the load task decreases. 
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Reasoning about conflict problems was associated with more errors on both the 
visuospatial load task used in Experiment 1 and on the phonological load task used in 
Experiment 2. Thus, it seems as though syllogistic reasoning (specifically, the suppression of 
responses based on heuristics) relies on both visuospatial and phonological WM.  Another 
possibility, however, is that the verbal and visuospatial load tasks both taxed the central 
executive component of WM, which is thought to be heavily involved in reasoning (Gilhooly et 
al., 1993). Disentangling independent roles of the central executive, visuospatial sketchpad, and 
phonological loop to syllogistic reasoning poses a ch llenge to researchers because scores on 
tasks designed to tap into the three components are frequently highly correlated (Capon et al., 
2003).  
The findings of this study do not directly oppose either the mental models account of 
reasoning, which asserts that deductive reasoning problems are represented as spatial, diagram-
like entities, or the mental logic account, which asserts that problems are reasoned through using 
verbal formal logic rules. It is possible that problems are represented both spatially and verbally. 
Although proponents of the mental models account clearly ascribe a large role to spatial 
representation in reasoning, they do not rule out cncurrent verbal representation. That is, 
although mental models are often referred to as being iconic or spatial in nature, in their basic 
form they are simply representations of relations among entities. It is conceivable that verbal 
strategies assist in the conceptualization of these r lations, especially given the assertion that 
models “underlie visual images, although many components of models are not visualizable” 
(Johnson-Laird, 2001, p. 434).  
Whereas the finding that both verbal and visuospatial WM plays a role in deductive 
reasoning can be unified with the mental models account, it is not consistent with the mental 
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logic account. This account staunchly rejects involvement of visual imagery in reasoning while 
proposing that reasoning is accomplished solely through verbally represented formal logic rules 
(Rips, 1994). Thus, this account would not predict the finding of Experiment 1 that visuospatial 
rehearsal and syllogistic reasoning competed for cognitive resources, assuming that participants 
did in fact rehearse the arrays visually, as opposed to using a verbal rule to represent the arrays.  
Recently, fMRI studies have examined neural mechanisms involved in syllogistic 
reasoning. Studies by Goel and colleagues (see Goel, 2003 for a summary) corroborate the 
finding of the current studies that reasoning is accomplished through both visuospatial and 
linguistic processes. Participants in his studies reasoned through syllogisms containing 
statements with concrete content (e.g., “All poodles are dogs”) or abstract content (e.g., “All N 
are P”). He found activation primarily in a left frontal-temporal network, implicated in language 
and semantic processing, for problems with concrete content, and in a bilateral occipito-parietal 
network, implicated in the processing of spatial information, for problems with abstract content. 
However, both neural networks were necessary for reasoning about both types of problems. Goel 
later discovered that it is the familiar, belief-laden content in concrete problems that activates the 
left frontal-temporal network. He posits that the two neural networks activated in syllogistic 
reasoning can be mapped onto the two reasoning systems outlined by dual process accounts of 
reasoning. The frontal-temporal network automatically nd effortlessly responds to syllogisms 
with belief-laden content. If no semantic or belief- aden content is available, or when a conflict is 
detected between the believability and validity of the conclusion, the slower and effortful parietal 
network is activated. Thus, according to Goel, the heuristic system maps onto the frontal-
temporal network and is language-based, whereas the analytic system maps onto the parietal 
network and is spatially-based. This theory is not entirely consistent with the results of the 
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current study: If the analytic system is spatially-based, we would expect reasoning about conflict 
problems, which should recruit the analytic system, to impair performance on the secondary load 
task only when the load task is also spatially-based. Conversely, Experiment 2 demonstrated that 
reasoning through conflict problems also impaired prformance on a verbal load task, indicating 
that the analytic system is at least partially language-based. Nonetheless, taken together, the 
results from the current studies along with Goel’s results suggest that neither verbal nor 
visuospatial reasoning strategies are utilized in isolation.  
Individual Differences in Working Memory and Reasoning 
A second approach used in the current studies compared the reasoning of participants 
with low WM spans to participants with high WM spans. Both Experiments 1 and 2 
demonstrated that Low Span participants made significa tly more errors on Invalid, 
Unbelievable syllogisms than did High Span participants (see Figures 2 and 4). This novel 
finding was unexpected, given that dual process theories predict that individuals with limited 
WM resources should rely more on heuristic processes when faced with a challenging logic 
problem. Thus, these theories would predict that participants with low WM spans would respond 
“Invalid” more frequently to unbelievable conclusions. Rather, it seems as though participants 
with more cognitive resources were particularly astute at indentifying when the believability and 
validity of conclusions conflicted and when they did not. When there was no conflict, such as 
when conclusions were invalid and unbelievable, these participants were able to utilize belief 
information, along with validity information, to their advantage when reasoning through 
syllogisms. In contrast, participants with fewer cognitive resources ignored belief information.  
 This finding is consistent with past studies indicating that when belief information is 
available, people are at times more accurate when reasoning. Newstead, Pollard, Evans, and 
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Allen (1992; and later replicated by Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994), found relatively 
high error rates for invalid conclusions free of belief information. People were more accurate 
when reasoning about invalid conclusions when the conclusions were unbelievable. Interestingly, 
however, the converse was not found when conclusions were believable: People did not endorse 
more invalid conclusions when conclusions were believable compared to neutral. In general, 
reasoners in Newstead’s studies seemed to use belief information to aid their reasoning only 
when it was useful; otherwise, it was ignored. 
 Differences between high WM and low WM reasoners found in the current studies can be 
explained in terms of dual process theories. In particular, high WM reasoners were able to 
recognize when the believability and validity of con lusions did not conflict. Thus, when 
conclusions were invalid and unbelievable, they likely responded in accordance with heuristic 
processing, without appealing to analytic processing. Conversely, low WM participants seemed 
unable to recognize that when conclusions were unbelievable, belief information could aid their 
reasoning. They likely used analytic processing to reason through all problems with unbelievable 
conclusions, and because analytic processing is sensitive to WM limitations, made more errors. 
Response time analyses in future studies may support the hypotheses set forth by the current 
studies. Because high WM reasoners are thought to use q ick, heuristic processes for problems 
in which the validity and believability of the conclusion conflicts, their responding on no-conflict 
problems should be much quicker than their responding on no-conflict problems, for which they 
presumably use slow, effortful analytic reasoning. Conversely, response latencies of low WM 
reasoners should be equally long for conflict and no-conflict problems (particularly for invalid, 





Utilizing belief information when it is consistent with the logical validity of the 
conclusion is naturally a very useful strategy, particularly given that in everyday life, we do not 
often have to reason about scenarios that are contrary to what we know about the world. By 
using belief-based heuristics, reasoners can avoid time-consuming, effortful analytic reasoning. 
Thus, perhaps a hallmark of astute reasoners is theability to utilize information consistent with 
their knowledge about the world, along with information about the objective validity of 
conclusions, when reasoning. Indeed, good decision-making involves integrating several sources 
of useful information while ignoring information that may be misleading. In the current studies, 
only individuals with sufficient WM resources were able to do this. Examining whether 
reasoning according to biases is a useful strategy in s llogistic reasoning, and in decision-making 
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Appendix A: Syllogisms used in Experiments 1 and 2 
Valid, Believable Invalid, Believable 
 
No video recorders are metal things 
Some electric appliances are metal things 




No electric appliances are metal things 
Some video recorders are metal things 
Therefore, some electric appliances are not 
video recorders 
No astronauts are athletic 
Some healthy people are athletic 
Therefore, some healthy people are not 
astronauts 
No healthy people are athletic 
Some astronauts are athletic 
Therefore, some healthy people are not 
astronauts 
 
No skyscrapers are wooden things 
Some buildings are wooden things 
Therefore, some buildings are not 
skyscrapers 
 
No buildings are wooden things 
Some skyscrapers are wooden things 
Therefore, some buildings are not 
skyscrapers 
No cigarettes are inexpensive 
Some addictive things are inexpensive 
Therefore, some addictive things are not 
cigarettes 
 
No addictive things are inexpensive 
Some cigarettes are inexpensive 
Therefore, some addictive things are not 
cigarettes 
No police dogs are vicious 
Some highly trained dogs are vicious 
Therefore, some highly trained dogs are 
not police dogs 
No highly trained dogs are vicious  
Some police dogs are vicious 
Therefore, some highly trained dogs are 
not police dogs 
 
No liquors are sweet things 
Some drinks are sweet things 
Therefore, some drinks are not liquors 
No drinks are sweet things 
Some liquors are sweet things 
Therefore, some drinks are not liquors 
 
No trout are colourful things 
Some fish are colourful things 
Therefore, some fish are not trout 
No fish are colourful things 
Some trout are colourful things 
Therefore, some fish are not trout 
 
No millionaires are scientists 
Some rich people are scientists 
Therefore, some rich people are not 
millionaires 
No rich people are scientists 
Some millionaires are scientists 






Valid, Unbelievable Invalid, Unbelievable 
 
No pieces of furniture are attractive things 
Some tables are attractive things 
Therefore, some tables are not pieces of 
furniture 
 
No tables are attractive things 
Some pieces of furniture are attractive 
things 
Therefore, some tables are not pieces of 
furniture 
 
No musical instruments are shiny 
Some violins are shiny 
Therefore, some violins are not musical 
instruments 
 
No violins are shiny 
Some musical instruments are shiny 
Therefore, some violins are not musical 
instruments 
No well-educated people are impartial 
Some judges are impartial 
Therefore, some judges are not well-
educated people 
Some judges are impartial 
Some well-educated people are impartial 
Therefore, some judges are not well-
educated people 
 
No plants are living things 
Some grasses are living things 
Therefore, some grasses are not plants 
 
No grasses are living things 
Some plants are living things 
Therefore, some grasses are not plants 
No religious people are married 
Some priests are married 
Therefore, some priests are not religious 
people 
 
No priests are married 
Some religious people are married 
Therefore, some priests are not religious 
people 
No good swimmers are vegetarians 
Some deep sea divers are vegetarians 
Therefore, some deep sea divers are not 
good swimmers 
No deep sea divers are vegetarians 
Some good swimmers are vegetarians 
Therefore, some deep sea divers are not 
good swimmers 
 
No tools are heavy 
Some screwdrivers are heavy 
Therefore, some screwdrivers are not tools 
No screwdrivers are heavy 
Some tools are heavy 
Therefore, some screwdrivers are not tools 
 
No nutritional things are expensive 
Some vitamin tablets are expensive 
Therefore, some vitamin tablets are not 
nutritional things 
No vitamin tablets are expensive 
Some nutritional things are expensive 








Experiment 1: Mean Endorsement Proportions for Low and High WM Span Participants under 
Low and High Load 
 






 Low Load High Load 
Low Span (n = 22)   
Valid/Believable  .71 (.37) .80 (.30) 
Valid/Unbelievable  .61 (.37) .73 (.37) 
Invalid/Believable  .66 (.32) .61 (.38) 
Invalid/Unbelievable .43 (.36) .45 (.43) 
High Span (n = 20)   
Valid/Believable  .82 (.24) .78 (.34) 
Valid/Unbelievable  .70 (.34) .70 (.38) 
Invalid/Believable  .52 (.41) .55 (.39) 




Experiment 1: Mean Accuracy Proportions on Load Task for Low and High WM Span 
Participants 
 










 Low Span (n = 22) High Span (n = 20) 
Valid/Believable  .94 (.11) .95 (.13) 
Valid/Unbelievable  .81 (.23) .93 (.12) 
Invalid/Believable  .93 (.18) .93 (.12) 
Invalid/Unbelievable .90 (.15) .97 (.11) 
36 
 
Table 3  
Experiment 2: Mean Endorsement Proportions for Low and High WM Span Participants under 
Low and High Load 
 
 





 Low Load High Load 
Low Span (n = 33)   
Valid/Believable  .76 (.33) .82 (.24) 
Valid/Unbelievable  .53 (.37) .62 (.38) 
Invalid/Believable  .59 (.40) .62 (.40) 
Invalid/Unbelievable .54 (.34) .39 (.35) 
High Span (n = 47)   
Valid/Believable  .65 (.33) .71 (.33) 
Valid/Unbelievable  .67 (.32) .68 (.35) 
Invalid/Believable  .57 (.39) .59 (.38) 




Experiment 2: Mean Accuracy Proportions on Load Task for Low and High WM Span 
Participants 
 










 Low Span (n = 22) High Span (n = 20) 
Valid/Believable  .61 (.24) .71 (.28) 
Valid/Unbelievable  .62 (.31) .61 (.25) 
Invalid/Believable  .55 (.21) .73 (.25) 





Figure 1.  Experiment 1 high load task sequence. 
Figure 2.  Experiment 1: Mean endorsement proportions for Low Span and High Span 
participants collapsed across load condition. 
Figure 3.  Experiment 2 low load task sequence. 
Figure 4.  Experiment 2: Mean endorsement proportions for Low Span and High Span 
participants collapsed across load condition 
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